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Eurocurrency markets have grown considerably in the last
20 years. This growth has stimulated awareness of the money and credit
creating potential of these markets. As a consequence, the necessity
and possible implementation of administrative controls of Euromarkets
have been discussed, in the literature as well as among monetary
1)authorities . The debate is going on; conclusions reached so far
2)differ substantially on basic issues
In the following paper, I focus on the monetary expansion poten­
tial of the Euro-DM market in relation to money stock control in Germany. 
To establish the necessary institutional knowledge for the attempted 
(partial) analysis, I first describe (part I) some relevant characteris­
tics of the Euro-DM market as well as some basic features of monetary 
control in Germany. In part II the money and credit creating potential of 
the Euro-DM market is discussed in relation'to. monetary control in Germany 
The analysis contains a critical "institutional" view of multiplier analys 
and interest rate determination in the Euro-DM market. The main findings 
are summarized in some concluding remarks.
1) See, for example, Wallich (1979), Tobin (1980), Usher (1980), Mayer 
(1981), Cooke (1981), Frydl (1982).
2) For example on the so-called multiplier issue. For a recent juxtaposi­



























































































PART I - INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
1. Institutional Characteristics of the Euro-DM market 
• D ef i_n i.t i_on
The Euro-DM market is, in principle, the market for Deutsche 
Mark bank loans and deposits outside Germany. To get a statistically 
operational "working definition", the term "outside Germany" will be 
confined to the geographical coverage of available BIS statistics, that 
is, to the 13 countries reporting to the BIS (Bank for International 
Settlements) in Basle; these, are the EEC countries except Greece (and 
except Germany, of course) plus Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, Canada 
and Japan. In addition, the definition will be restricted to DM assets 
and liabilities of foreigners outside the Eurobank's country of residence; 
this means that, from the Eurobank's point of view, all Euro-DM transactions 
are necessarily border-crossing ones. In summary, the Euro-DM market is 
defined as the market for Deutsche Mark loans and deposits vis-à-vis non­
residents in 13 countries outside Germany.
-  2 -
1 )
. Ma£|<Si_Centers
The center of the market is clearly located in Europe; the word 
"Euro" seems to be, therefore, quite correct. Luxembourg is the most im­
portant market place for Euro-DM transactions, owing to the presence of 
about 30 subsidiaries of German banks (end 1981). In practice, these 
German Euro-banks constitute the total of the Luxembourg Euro-DM center. 
Compared with the total market volume of DM 270 billion gross liabilities 
(end 1981), the Luxembourg share amounts to approximately DM 150 billion.
Another important center of the Euro-DM market is London, where 
about a dozen German banks are represented by foreign branches. These 
branches are legally part of the German parent bank; therefore, they are 
(unlike subsidiaries) subject to German bank supervision. Taken together, 
Luxembourg and London account for about 2/3 of the market volume. The re­
mainder of Euro-DM deposits is mostly held with banks in France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland.
1) This section is based on a recent survey article by the Deutsche Bundes­
bank (1983) and on two recent papers by Storck (April 1983) and Steffens 
(May 1983) given at the Institut fur Kapitalmarktforschung an der 
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The geographical proximity to West Germany is only 
one important reason for the actual location of the two Euro-DM
market centers. In addition, there are two major locational advantages 
in economic terms:
- In Luxembourg as well as in London, there are no minimum 
reserve requirements on Euro-bank deposits;
- Capital flows between Germany and these two market places are 
fully liberalized.
As a result, Euro-banks in Luxembourg and London are in a parti­
cularly favourable competitiye position; they are able to work, for 
example, on a rather smalt spread between deposit and lending rates (which 
amounts, as a rule, to 1/2 percentage point only).
In rather small amounts, Deutsche Mark transactions are also 
conducted by banks in the so-called offshore centers outside Europe - 
for instance in the Carribean (where German banks are represented by 
branches) or in Singapore and Hong Kong. Since December 1981 Euro-DM 
deposits may also be held with IBF's (International Banking Facilities) 
in the United States.
. Volume and Growth
According to BIS statistics, the Deutsche Mark bank deposits held 
by commercial banks, monetary authorities and non-banks in 
13 reporting countries outside Germany amounted to DM 270 billion in 
mid-1982. The corresponding figure of DM 287 billion on the asset side 
of Euro-bank balance sheets diverged only slightly from this liability 
position. Relative to all Eurocurrency markets in the European report­
ing area, Canada and Japan (13 countries, see above), the Euro-DM market 



























































































Just Like other Euro-currency markets, the Euro-DM market 
has expanded much faster than comparable domestic markets. Total
outstanding Deutsche Mark liabilities vis-à-vis non-residents of the 
European reporting banks were,in June 1982,about five times as large as 
ten years earlier; Euro-DM holdings in that decade thus grew on average 
by about 19 % per year (while the business volume of domestic German banks 
increased only half as much).
The Euro-DM market did not expand continuously, however; growth 
rates fluctuated sharply in reaction to external influences. For example, 
the pace of expansion accelerated sharply in response to the dollar crisis 
in 1977/78 and the second oil price explosion in 1979. In 1980/81 changed 
forms of recycling OPEC surpluses (like direct official borrowing in OPEC 
countries) and a sharp decline in OPEC's current account surplus caused 
much lower growth rates in Eurocurrency markets. This slack was particular­
ly felt in the DM part of the markets, as a delining DM exchange rate trend 
(against the US dollar) and relatively low German interest rates rendered 
the Deutsche Mark Less attractive than the US dollar. This situation has 
continued until recently.
In DM deposit and lending business, the principle of currency-
matched funding applies, i.e. Deutsche Mark assets are basically funded
by Deutsche Mark liabilities, so that the Euro-banks do not incur an exchange
rate risk. There is another "matching" between DM assets of Euro-banks and
2 )their DM liabilities: Both total amounts are usually largely in balance
Just like in the Euro-Dollar market, the deposits in the Euro-DM 
market are of a short-term nature, ranging from daily call money to funds 
for one, three or twelve months; maturities up to three months seem to 
dominate.
-  4 -
1) As. regards interest rates, see pp. 18 below.




























































































Deposits are generally traded only in large, standardized amounts
from a minimum of roughly DM 500.000 onwards^. This feature of the market
2 )is sometimes called its "wholesale" character
Unlike in the Euro-dollar market, there are no negotiable certi­
ficates of deposit in the Deutsche Mark sector of the Euro-market, so 
that deposits cannot be transferred to other market participants before 
maturity.
Lending is tailored to deposit business, i.e. to the large share 
of 'very short-term deposits: Euro-banks perform maturity transformation 
by taking short-term deposits and extending long-term loans. Technically, 
long-term lending to non-banks is typically given in the form of roll­
over credits: The nominal interest rate on such loans is fixed for a short 
period of 3 or 6 months only, and then repeatedly "rolled over", and ad­
justed, to the current cost of refinancing.
This technique assures that interest rates on loans closely 
follow the short-term borrowing cost of Euro-banks, i.e. their offered 
deposit rates; and it leads to a clear-cut distribution of risk-taking:
The risk of interest rate changes rests fully with the borrower; the 
risk of maturity transformation (i.e. of securing a follow-up financing) 
rests fully with the bank.
. Market_Part i_ci_gants
Market participants are mainly the Euro-banks 
themselves. They conduct sizable interbank transactions in order to 
exploit interest rate differentials and to adjust their liquidity position 
The share of these transactions between Euro-banks is substantial: about 
two thirds of the total market volume (roughly DM 200 billion out of total 
liabilities of DM 270 billion) is likely to be accounted for by interbank 
transact!- ons.
1) Storck (1980), p. 450.
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Foreign central banks are major depositors in the market, too. 
Usually, their motivation is distribution of exchange rate risk, to be 
accomplished by currency diversification of their monetary reserves. 
Their deposits in Euro-DM amounted to DM 40 billion in June 1982.
Non-banks from Germany and abroad are depositing considerable 
amounts in the Euro-DM market, too (a total of DM 28 billion). However, 
German and foreign non-banks are much more important as borrowers in the 
Euro-DM market. In June 1982, German non-banks alone were indebted to 
the Euro-DM market to an amount of DM 73 billion; together with foreign 
non-banks_(DM 27 billion), outstanding Euro-DM loans to non-banks thus 
totalled DM 100 billion.
Most interesting, in the present context, is the role of domestic 
German banks. In general, if there are no barriers to international 
capital flows, the Euromarket is, in the respective national currency, to 
be seen as an extension of the domestic money market - and not as an 
independent banking system of its own. As there are no restrictions on 
capital transactions in Germany, the German banks may place,for example, 
excess liquidity in the Euro-DM market at any time. Euro-DM borrowings 
by German banks are likewise unrestricted.
Several points of clarification and explanation are needed here:
. The Role of Domestic German Banks
The net DM position of German banks with Euro-banks has fluctuated 
markedly over time. In June 1982 the outstanding DM assets of Euro-banks 
vis-à-vis German banks amounted to DM 42 billion, which was about 15 % 
of total assets of the Euro-DM market (in the narrow working definition 
given above). At the same time, Euro-banks held DM liabilities against 
German banks in the amount of DM 30 billion. On balance, therefore, there 
was a net creditor position of Euro-banks vis-à-vis German banks of 
DM 12 billion. Four years ago, in mid-1978, this net indebtedness of German 
banks in the Euro-DM market stood at DM 5 billion. There has always been, 
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As the Euro-DM market is not independent of the German money 
market, its role as a channel for short-term capital flows is closely 
linked to the activities of domestic German banks, too. This is illustrated 
by the balancing function of German banks in the Euro-DM market. If there 
are large (say,speculati ve) short-term inflows into the Euro-DM market, 
there will be an increasing surplus of funds in the market (deposits are 
much more flexible than loans). Euro-banks respond by running down their 
short-term DM-liabilities to German banks, i.e. increasing their net credi­
tor position against German banks. After the period of speculation (for 
instance, when the expècted DM exchange rate change has taken place), 
thece will be a decline in DM-deposits of foreigners at Euro-banks. Cor­
respondingly, Euro-banks are forced to borrow from domestic German banks, 
thus decreasing their net creditor position against German banks"* \  Ex­
perience corroborates this. In June 1981, before the EMS-realignment of 
October 1981, net indebtedness of German banks vis-à-vis banks in the 
Euro-DM market amounted to DM 15 billion; after the realignment, in Decem­
ber 1981, this figure had fallen to DM 6 billion.
Finally, it should be noted that the involvement of German banks
in the Euro-DM market rests on a particular institutional detail: In
principle, short-term borrowings by German banks in this market are subject
to German minimum reserve requirements. However, owing to numerous
exemptions, only about one quarter of the bank's external
2 )DM-liabi lities are actually reservable . Above
all, funds may flow from the Euro-market to German banks without being 
subject to the minimum reserve if the agreed maturity is at least four years. 
Furthermore, capital imports through sales of bank bonds are minimum 
reservefree,even if the remaining maturity of these bonds is short. The 
possibility of such minimum reservefree borrowings in the Euro-DM market 
is the basis for German banks to borrow on a large scale in that market.
1) A positive explanation of the fact that Euro-banks have been continuously 
in a net creditor position vis-à-vis German banks basically reflects the 
past experience of continued foreign investments in the Deutsche Mark, 
which gradually became the second important currency in international port­
folio diversification. In particular, foreign investors favoured the Euro- 
DM market relatively to the domestic German market due to more attractive 
interest rates (no minimum reserve burden in the Euro-market) and because 
there were in Germany no suitable short-term investment possibilities ex­
cept sight and time deposits subject to the minimum reserve requirement.































































































The German money market is, in its narrow definition, an inter­
bank market for central bank balances. In this definition, the market is, 
for example, the analogue to the 'Federal Funds Market' in the U.S.
Market participants are domestic banks only. Central bank balances 
are held by these domestic banks on giro (current) account at the Deutsche 
Bundesbank system; the balances do not earn interest.
Transactions between domestic banks in central bank balances are 
generally of a very short-term nature: maturities of funds tended or 
deposited range between 1 day and one year. In correspondance to the Euro-DM 
market, maturities up to 3 months dominate.
For a precise definition of central bank balances R and their re­
lation to the concept of central bank money Z ("base money"), see table 
on page 9.
. Domest i_c_Monetary_Tar2£t
The monetary target of the Deutsche Bundesbank is central bank 
money stock MZ. It is composed of currency in circulation C and the reserve 
component RR^, i.e. the required minimum reserves on domestic liabilities 
at constant reserve ratios as of January 1974; hence
MZ = C + "RR ,.d
(For details,see table on page 9).
-  8 -
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Central bank balances, central bank money, and 
central bank money stock target in Germany
Currency in circulation at non-banks (C)
Total Required Reserves at 




Required Reserves on domestic
liabilities at constant reserve





Z = C + RR + RE MZ = C + RR\d
RR + RE = Çentral_bank 
balances (R)
RR = 0,090 + 0,06T + 0,04S + 0,08F 
(reserve ratios as of December 1982)
RRd = 0,170 + 0,12T + 0,08S 






Domestic Time Deposits )
Domestic Savings Deposits )
Foreign Deposits subject to 
reserve requirements
up to 4 years 
of maturity 
minimum
Orders of magnitude (Dec. 1982) 
C = DM 89 billion




RR , d ^  DM 85 billion






























































































• t _ion_o f _D omes 12£_Mone t a r^_C ont ro J.
Monetary control is implemented on the domestic money market by 
means of the interest rates prevailing on this market. On the domestic 
money market, the Bundesbank controls, via its traditional interest rate 
and liquidity policy, the conditions, i.e. the interest rate cost, on 
which a single domestic bank can acquire central bank balances from another 
bank. The German banking system (i.e. all domestic banks together) needs 
additional central bank balances as a result of its prior monetary expan­
sion: As banking business and, therefore, liabilities subject to minimum re­
serve regulations increase, there will be additional currency demand plus addi­
tional minimum reserve requirements: Both factors force banks to bid for addi­
tional central bank balances in order to refinance their expansion. Given this 
necessity, the Bundesbank can exert a restrictive influence on monetary expan­
sion of the domestic banking system by raising its refinance costs (money mai—  
ket interest rates), and vice versa. For example, a sustained reduction in no­
minal money market interest rates tends to show up, after some months, and via 
a chain of interest rate relationships in various financial markets (interest 
rate structure), in an accelerating growth of central bank money stock. The re­
cent acceleration of money stock growth in Germany is an example forthismeachnism.
Why is there no room for a direct, quantitative control of money 
stock growth via manipulated changes in central bank balances? The answer 
is to be based on the knowledge of the institutional framework of monetary 
policy in Germany - in particular on the calculation and handling of the 
minimum reserve instrument.
a) Required reserves are calculated on the basis of bank liabili­
ties on 23rd and last day of prior month, and on 7th and 15th day of current 
month. Hence, banks know their refinance needs, due to past expansionary 
activities, around mid-month, and there is no way for them to change lateron 
the amount of this required refinancing.
b) As the Bundesbank does not want to force banks into non-fulfil­
ment of their minimum reserve requirements, she has to fur­
nish, for the current month, the additional central bank balances necessary 
for the domestic banking system to fulfil the reserve requirements. Hence,
in theory and practice, German banks do not need any prior excess liquidity




























































































(in the sense of excess reserves or any actual or potential central bank 
balances) to expand their activities, i.e. grant new loans and create 
new (monetary) liabilities. There is, therefore, no sense in using any 
credit or money multiplier analysis in the various forms given in the 
literature. Banks are able,to put the point succinctly, to grant loans 
without any prior excess liquidity.
c) In the longer term, however, the cost of (necessary) re­
financing is dictated by the Bundesbank via some suitable combination 
of its interest rate and liquidity policies, applied to the domestic 
money market (see above).
• R e^a 12on_t o_Mone^_and_C r edî  t _ F re s_î n_t he_Eu ro—DM_Ma r k et
The bulk of Euro-DM deposits are interbank deposits between 
Eurobanks, funds from other banks and central banks. All these deposits 
do not count as money in the conventional definition: Among the DM-lia- 
bilities of Euro-banks to non-residents, only the deposits of non-banks 
should be considered as money comparable to a domestic money stock defi­
nition. The corresponding total of DM 28 billion Euro-DM deposits in 
mid-1982 was composed of DM 18 billion deposits held by foreign non-banks 
and DM 10 billion deposits held by German non-banks. These DM 10 billion 
are directly comparable with domestic demand deposits (up to 30 days) or 
time deposits (1 month to 4 years); they are, due to their short maturi­
ties, at least as "moneylike" as domestic time deposits*^.
As measured by domestic money stock M2 (currency, demand and 
time deposits held in Germany by German non-banks, totalling roughly 
DM 500 billion), the Euro-DM deposits of German non-banks are comparative­
ly small at about 2 %. Owing to the rapid growth of the Euro-DM market, 
this share has been built up relatively soon, however. Therefore, there is 
some reason that shifts in time deposits between the domestic
market and the Euro-market may increasingly undermine the informative
1) This is by now the official assessment of the German Central Bank, 




























































































value of domestic monetary aggregates. Between mid-1980 and mid-1981, for 
example, the domestic money stock M2 (i.e. excluding Euro-DM 
deposits) grew by 11 %, while the Euro-DM deposits of German non-banks 
nearly doubled. An extended monetary aggregate including such Euro-DM 
deposits, would have indicated a somewhat stronger monetary expansion^.
In June 1982, outstanding DM-loans granted to German non-banks 
by Euro-banks amounted to DM 73 billion. Again, these borrowings in the 
Euro-DM market are not recorded in the traditional monetarystatisties, which are 
confined to the domestic banking system. Therefore, credit expansion as 
measured in Germany can provide misleading information about actual 
credit demand. For example, traditional domestic monetary
statistics showed, in the first half of 1982, a seasonally adjusted in­
crease of "bank loans to German enterprises and households of DM 30 billion
or 5,6 % annual rate; including loans granted by Euro-banks, the figures
2 )are much higher, showing an increase of DM 38 billion or 6,0 % . In terms
of volume: short-term Euro-DM loans to German enterprises have meanwhile 
reached a share of 15 % of comparable short-term loans in the domestic 
market.
Taken together, the basic figures for money and credit reveal that 
the existence of Euro-DM deposits of German non-banks as well as Euro-DM 
loans to German non-banks clearly jeodardize the information content of 
strictly domestic money or credit aggregates. Moreover, as interest rates 
to be paid on Euro-DM loans are normally lower than on domestic loans, 
the faster growth of Euro-bank business relative to domestic bank business 
might continue.
What does this mean for the monetary control issue? There are two 
main areas to be investigated:
- The money and credit creating potential of the Euro-DM market 
and the mechanism of its possible interference with domestic monetary con­
trol in Germany; and
- The interest rate interrelationships between the German and the 
Euro-DM money markets, as interest rates are at the heart of German money 
stock control procedures.
1) Deutsche Bundesbank (1983), p. 32.




























































































PART II - MONETARY EXPANSION IN THE EURO-DM MARKET : THE MULTIPLIER ISSUE 
AND THE INTEREST RATE LINKAGE
1. Reflections on the Euro-Currency Deposit Multiplier
The "Euro-currency deposit (or credit) multiplier" is a short­
hand name to describe the alledged ability of Euro-banks "to expand auto­
nomously the stock of money and credit outside the control of national
1) . . authorities" . There are two basic points of interest here:
- the monetary expansion potential of the Euro-banking system 
alone, resulting from the assumption that some constant proportion of lend- 
ed funds is redeposited in the system; and
- the monetary expansion potential of the combined Euro- and 
national banking systems,in view of the close interrelationships between 
domestic and Euro-markets.
Both issues are to be discussed, in the present narrow context, 
in terms of a Euro-DM multiplier concept. Before that, some general points 
of clarifications should be advanced:
. The focus will be on the direct contribution (or interaction) 
of monetary expansion in the Euro-DM market to (with) domestic monetary
developments; no indirect contributions or interrelationship will be dis-
.2)cussed
1) Johnston (1981), p. 5.
2) For example, the Euro-DM market has increased the mobility of inter­
national capital movements as well as the substitutability of DM- 
assets in other currencies. This, in turn, might have contributed to 
higher exchange rate variability, thus provoking increased exchange 
market interventions by the German central bank. Those interventions, 
however, may pose a potential threat to a successful control of 
domestic monetary targets. - On these matters, see for example Gleske 




























































































. There are at Least two conflicting theoretical approaches
to the Euro-currency multiplier issue: The Friedman-type view of a
1)fixed coefficient ex post multiplier , and Tobin's "new view" embodied 
in portfolio equilibrium models of the monetary expansion process^.
Both approaches, the early fixed coefficient models of
multistage banking system expansion as well as their later extension 
to general equilibrium portfolio models, have been criticized on theo­
retical terms as an inadequate framework for monetary analysis of inter­
national financial markets"^. This discussion is not taken up here.
. Instead of abstract theoretical arguments, the following
4)reflections are mainly based on explicit institutional considerations
1) See Friedman (1969) and Carli (1971), Mayer (1971), Wi llms (1976) for 
an early application of this "old view", which may be traced back to 
Phi11i ps (1920).
2) See Tobin (1963) and Swoboda (1980) or Johnston (1981) for recent 
applications of the "new view".
3) For a recent critique, see for example Mayer (1979), Folkerts-Landau 
(1982) and de Cecco (1982).
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1.1 The Monetary Expansion Potential of the Euro-DM Market
The "endogenous" Euro-multiplier issue concerns, as mentioned, 
the ability of Euro-banks to expand irrespective of existing interrela­
tionships with "outside" markets or banks. The crucial assumption in our 
case would require, therefore, that the Euro-DM market should not be con­
sidered as a part of the German money market, but as a separate banking 
system of its own. It has been demonstrated above that this assumption is 
untenable. As the Euro-DM market is not a closed banking system, the 
very idea (or concept) of an endogenous Euro-DM multiplier simply does 
not apply. It could be argued, therefore, that any further and closer 
look at that multiplier idea does not make sense.
Nevertheless, in order to state the case against the usefulness 
of endogenous Euro-DM multiplier analysis as strongly as possible, a short 
explicit presentation of the multiplier idea should be given, followed by a 
short critical discussion. It suffices to take the most simple 
Friedman-type multiplier concept, as the basic objective to be raised 
in terms of multiplier stability apply to the Tobin-type approach as well.
The national endogenous multiplier analysis (assuming a closed domestic 
banking system) starts out with a given flow of central bank balances to 
bank A. It is then shown how additional deposits are created successive­
ly: The supplier (manufacturer) of the borrower of bank A takes up 
(redeems) the received cheque to a small part in cash; to a larger part, 
he deposits the proceeds of the cheque in his giro account at bank B.
This bank B in turn extends a loan on the basis of the received additional 
funds (demand deposits); this gives rise,on the part of the supplier (manu­
facturer) of the borrower of bank B, to a new demand deposit at bank C, 
and so on with diminishing absolute amounts. The overall total of the 
demand deposits created during this process depends,ceteris paribus,on the 
banking system's reserve ratio r and on the cash/deposit ratio d, such that
D = D*/(r + d), (1)
with D denoting total new deposits inclusive of the original (initial)
* 1)deposits D
1) Alt this is standard textbook approach. For a classic (and critical) 




























































































The (Friedman-type) Eurocurrency multiplier concept is con­
structed in simple analogy to the national multiplier concept. The 
domestic cash leakage denoted by d corresponds to the outflow of 
funds from the Euro-DM market, either by currency conversion or by trans­
action to the domestic (money) market. If we denote these Euro-market 
leakages by d^, and take into account the absence of reserve requirements 
(r^ = 0), the Euro-DM market multiplier is correspondingly
De = DE*/dE (2)
with D denoting total new (demand) deposits in the Euro-market, which 
E * 
again include the original deposits DE .
In order to be of any analytical use, these multiplier concepts
should, as a minimum requirement, be empirically stable, roughly constant
and foreseeable magnitudes. The domestic multiplier meets these criteria
insofar as the reserve ratio r is given (unless it is discretionarity changed
by the central bank), and the currency leakage d (the ratio of total cui—
1)rency in circulation to total demand deposits) changes only slowly and 
gradually over time.
The endogenous Euro-DM (and, in general, any Euro-currency) 
multiplier concept does not, however, fulfil these requirements, as there 
are rather variable leakages (denoted by the summary measure dE):
- experience of the last 10 years shows that DM-funds are convert­
ed into other currencies, e.g. due to interest rate differentials or exchange 
rate expectations, in large and,at times, drastically variable amounts;
- DM-funds are flowing into the domestic German market in variable 
amounts (see above: Euro-market as extension of domestic money market).
1) The range of deposits to be included depends on the underlying definition 
of money and on the elasticity of substitution between various forms of 
deposit components of the money stock. Constraining the analysis to demand 




























































































As a consequence, a causal connection between successive deposits 
may be postulated for a closed domestic badking system, but not for the 
Euro-market. This is another way of saying that an Euro-DM multiplier 
would be unstable and, therefore, would be analytically useless.
Finally,the Euro-DM multiplier concept (2) wouLd ignore the 
existence of institutional constraints, which may interfere with a postulated 
"clean" multiplier mechanism. The local banking supervising authority 
of the main Euro-DM market center Luxembourg, (Commissariat au Contrôle des 
Banques"), insists for example on balance sheet principles like a minimum 
capital coefficient On this provision, business expansion might be 
constrained by an insufficient ratio to the Euro-banks' own capital. In 
particular, as the interest rate margins in the lending business are 
rather narrow (roughly 1/2 % point), the Euro-bank's capital is bound to 
grow, via accumulation of interest rate profits, rather slowly in relation 
to its overall balance sheet expansion.
There seems to be only one case for a special application of an 
Euro-DM multiplier concept: It has been observed, at some instances, in the 
past, that a customer gets a loan from an Euro-bank and deposits the pro­
ceeds fully with that very same bank. Clearly, there are no technical limits 
in repeating this; one might talk of an infinitely large multiplier or an 
infinitely elastic credit supply of a single bank in that special case.
And there have been, at times, comparable activities of foreign central 
banks who increased in.this way their gross currency reserves and their 
international liquidity position. But, to repeat: These are special cases, 
and they apply to selected single banks only.




























































































1.2 A Multiplier Concept for the Combined Domestic and Euro-DM Banking 
System?
The idea of using multiplier analysis for the combined domestic 
and Euro-market expansion possibilities is directly related to the mone­
tary control issue: The relationship between some quantitative domestic 
control variables li ke "base money" or bank reserves and the domestic 
money stock growth might be weakened, or even destroyed, by the existence 
of Euro-currency markets^. In the present study, it will be left open 
if multiplier analysis should be considered as an analytically useful 
tool on such a general level. Focusing on the DM segment of Eurocurrency 
markets, however, we have to acknowledge that the domestic
monetary control variable is not a bank reserves or monetary base 
magnitude, but the nominal money market interest rate (see above). This 
draws, by any means, attention away from possible quantitative inter­
relationships between domestic bank liquidity and Euro-DM
deposit creation, if the control aspect is to be analyzed. Therefore, the 
following sections concentrate on "the interest rate-side" of the control 
i ssue.
It should, of course, be kept in mind that any "extended" money 
market analysis for the combined domestic and Euro-DM segments is a 
promising subject to pursue in its own right, with a view, for example, 
of the above mentioned indicator function of strictly domestic monetary 
aggregates or on actual payments transactions. For example, Euro-DM deposits 
(just like domestic time deposits) cannot be used directly for payment 
purposes (no cheques can be drawn, as a rule, on deposits with Euro-banks). 
They must be converted into DM demand deposits in Germany before they can 
be used for payment. Those issues seem to be, however, largely unconnected 
with any multiplier reasoning.
1) See, for example, recent analysis of the control issue by Mayer (1981), 




























































































2. The Interest Rate Linkage between the Domestic and the Euro-DM market
As regards the banks participating in both (interrelated) money 
markets, there are practically no differences of standing or of types of 
deposits. In general, DM assets in the domestic market are close substi­
tutes to DM assets in the Euro-DM market, and vice versa. In addition, there 
are no restrictions on the free flow of financial capital between both 
markets. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that nominal interest 
rates in both markets are closely connected. The linkage is established 
by-arbitrage transactions between domestic and Euro-banks. (There are, of 
course, arbitrage transactions by other markets participants, too). 
"Arbitrage" is here broadly defined as any financial transaction in 
Deutsche Mark between the domestic money market and the Euro-market 
which is undertaken in response to a widening in the Euro-DM/domestic
2 )interest rate differential and which tends to narrow the differential 
As all transactions are conducted in Deutsche Mark, arbitrage can be ana­
lyzed, in the present context, without explicit attention to forward 
cover and to traditional interest rate parity considerations: Market parti­
cipants do not face the necessity to change currencies in the course of 
arbitrage transactions.
2.1 Domestic and Euro-DM money market rates in the "arbitrage tunnel"
1 )
Empirical observation demonstrates that the Euro-DM rate moves, as 
a rule, within a rather narrow "arbitrage tunnel". Its upper ceiling is set 
by the domestic money market rate; the tunnel floor is set by this very 
same rate less minimum reserve costs on foreign liabilities. 12
1) For a concise treatment which is based on a more general, theoretical 
analysis of Euro-currency interest rate determination, see Johnston 
(1979) or the by now "classic" book by Einzig (1970). A recent empiri­
cal assessment is contained in Deutsche Bundesbank (1983), p. 33/34.




























































































Arbitrage tunnel of ^  
Euro-DM interest rate
*) Weekly figures (Wednesdays) in % p.a. (Source: Deutsche Bundesbank) 
ic Euro-DM interbank rate on three month deposits
iD Money market interbank rate in Frankfurt on three month deposits
rf Current German minimum reserve ratio on foreign time deposits 
(rF = 0,0795 Jan. - Sept. 1982; Tp = 0,0715 Oct. - Dec. 1982).
ipTp Minimum reserve cost. The tunnel floor is given by




























































































The chart shows, on the basis of weekly observations, the 
arbitrage tunnel and movements of the Euro-DM interest rate within 
that tunnel in 1982^. It is evident that the Euro-DM rate
closely follows the domestic money market rate (the tunnel ceiling).
Major deviations are only possible if there are, in addition to the 
regular minimum reserve, further administrative obstacles to arbitrage 
transactions or particularly strong short-run interest rate expectations. 
Obviously, then, control l ing the domestic money market rate means effective 
control of Euro-DM rates, too. What is the explanation for this in 
detail - how does arbitrage work in this case?
- If the Euro-DM rate i£ would exceed the domestic money market rate iD, 
German banks could obtain an easy profit simply by borrowing in the 
domestic money market and lending the proceeds i.n the Euro-DM interbank 
market. Therefore, a situation
(E >  1 2D
cannot persist. Such arbitrage transactions would quickly reduce the 
Euro-DM rate, at least to the level of the domestic money market rate.
- If the Euro-DM rate i£ would underpass the tunnel floor, it would differ 
from the domestic money market rate î  by more than minimum reserve cost 
on foreign liabilities,iDr . In such a situation, the effective cost of 
borrowing in the Euro-DM market would be, for German banks, lower than 
the cost of raising funds in the domestic money market. Therefore, if
we have
’e <  ^  - V f
there is again a possibility to arbitrage: German banks will borrow 
funds in the Euro-DM market and lend the proceeds in the domestic market 
at a profit. Consequently, the interest rate spread will narrow, at least 
to the point where there is equality between the Euro-rate and the 
effective domestic borrowing cost (the tunnel floor).
1) The chart is taken from Deutsche Bundesbank (1983), p. 33.
2) "Quickly" normally means within minutes rather than days or weeks: 
Today, large international banks should be considered as financial 
information corporations, which handle very efficient telecommunication 
and computer systems, implementing nearly instantaneous price adjust­
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Four qualifications should be added to the explanation just 
given.
First, it will be mainly the Euro-market rate which reacts 
to arbitrage transactions: The domestic money market is the 
"broader" one, and, more important, the domestic money market rate is 
controlled by the Bundesbank's interest rate and liquidity policy, i.e. 
it is "exogenous" to the Euro-rate.
Second, transaction cost have been neglected so far. This appears 
to be justified, as such costs are generally rather low in international 
financial markets relative to the transaction volumes. In the specific 
case of transactions between a domestic German bank and its, say, Luxem­
bourg subsidiary, these costs are virtually nil.
Third, the argument has been, of course, partial. No account has 
been taken of the interrelationship between domestic money market rates in 
DM and comparable rates for, say, federal funds in U.S. dollars. This 
differential has acted, at times at least, as an effective constraint 
on German interest rate policy (due to exchange rate and balance of 
payments considerations of the German authorities). Therefore, it is 
the Z/DM relationship (in interest rates as well as exchange rates) 
which might effectively limit the Bundesbank's autonomy to control 
domestic monetary expansion via interest rate changes.
Fourth, such broader external factors like the DM/Z exchange rate 
movements^or tendencies of the Euro-Z interest rate)are relevant for the 
position and movements of the Euro-DM interest rate within the "tunnel". 
The Euro-DM rate i£ will tend to rise, for example,
- when the DM/Z exchange rate is weak (foreigners moving out of DM 
and into Z assets, thus reducing the supply of DM);
- when the Euro-Z interest rate increases;
- when there are expectations for interest rate increases in 
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3. Concluding Remarks
Pulling the arguments advanced so far together, the following results 
emerge (on the basis of partial analysis, i.e. excluding interrelation­
ships with the Euro-dollar market or U.S. financial markets).
(1) The Bundesbank's control of interest rates at the domestic money market 
is effectively extended, via arbitrage transactions, on the Euro-DM 
market as well.
(2) Interest rate control is the means by which the Bundesbank effective­
ly controls the expansion of money and credit aggregates in Germany.
As a rule, there is a reliable inverse raltionship between domestic 
interest rates and monetary expansion.
(3) As interest rate control is extended to the Euro-DM market as well, 
there is no basic conflict between the Euro-market's money and credit 
creating potential and the Bundesbank's autonomy in terms of monetary 
control. The alledged dangers for domestic monetary control, derived 
statistically (from huge gross figures of Euro-market volume) and 
theoretically (from the notion of an endogenous Euro-market 
multiplier) seen to be exaggerated.
(4) However, as the money and credit creating potential of the Euro-DM mar­
ket is a limited, but given fact, there, i s some impact on domestic 
monetary control in Germany. Tentatively, it may be argued that the 
existence of the Euro-DM market requires stronger domestic interest 
rate changes to achieve a monetary expansion target, and that the 
time lags involved may be longer and/or more variable. This is a 
guess; there is so far no empirical evidence available on this point. 
Some factors like high capital mobility (due to the existence of Euro­
currency markets) provide, however, some indirect evidence, which has 
given rise, for example, to far reaching proposals for international 
monetary reform.*^
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(5) The money and credit creating potential of the Euro-DM market seems, 
however, to distort increasingly the information content of con­
ventional monetary expansion statistics, which are based on domestic 
figures only. Therefore, there is a danger that the indicator 
function of the German monetary target (central bank money stock) 
and of other domestic monetary and credit aggregates deteriorates.
There is, therefore, a need to reassess - and possibly redefine - 
the concept and meaning of such aggregates.
(6) In conclusion, points (4) and (5) do not justify a negative attitude 
towards the existence and working of the Euro-DM market. In particular, 
there seems to be no basic conflict between the existence of this 
market and the Bundesbank's autonomy to control domestic monetary 
expansion. Therefore, considerations to control Euro-markets by 
administrative regulations do not appear to be particularly urgent 
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